Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull more arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"A few late updates to address some issues arising from conflicts with
other trees:
- Removal of Qualcomm-specific Spectre-v2 mitigation in favour of the
generic SMCCC-based firmware call
- Fix EL2 hardening capability checking, which was bodged to reduce
conflicts with the KVM tree
- Add some currently unused assembler macros for managing SIMD
registers which will be used by some crypto code in the next merge
window"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64: assembler: add macros to conditionally yield the NEON under PREEMPT
arm64: assembler: add utility macros to push/pop stack frames
arm64: Move the content of bpi.S to hyp-entry.S
arm64: Get rid of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_*
arm64: capabilities: Rework EL2 vector hardening entry
arm64: KVM: Use SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor BP hardening
|
|
Add support macros to conditionally yield the NEON (and thus the CPU)
that may be called from the assembler code.
In some cases, yielding the NEON involves saving and restoring a non
trivial amount of context (especially in the CRC folding algorithms),
and so the macro is split into three, and the code in between is only
executed when the yield path is taken, allowing the context to be preserved.
The third macro takes an optional label argument that marks the resume
path after a yield has been performed.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We are going to add code to all the NEON crypto routines that will
turn them into non-leaf functions, so we need to manage the stack
frames. To make this less tedious and error prone, add some macros
that take the number of callee saved registers to preserve and the
extra size to allocate in the stack frame (for locals) and emit
the ldp/stp sequences.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC
V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses
the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead
of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
[maz: reworked errata framework integration]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
ARM64 doesn't walk the VMA tree in its flush_dcache_page()
implementation, so has no need to take the tree_lock.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180313132639.17387-4-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ARM, ARM64 and UniCore32 duplicate the definition of UL():
#define UL(x) _AC(x, UL)
This is not actually arch-specific, so it will be useful to move it to a
common header. Currently, we only have the uapi variant for
linux/const.h, so I am creating include/linux/const.h.
I also added _UL(), _ULL() and ULL() because _AC() is mostly used in
the form either _AC(..., UL) or _AC(..., ULL). I expect they will be
replaced in follow-up cleanups. The underscore-prefixed ones should
be used for exported headers.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1519301715-31798-4-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- VHE optimizations
- EL2 address space randomization
- speculative execution mitigations ("variant 3a", aka execution past
invalid privilege register access)
- bugfixes and cleanups
PPC:
- improvements for the radix page fault handler for HV KVM on POWER9
s390:
- more kvm stat counters
- virtio gpu plumbing
- documentation
- facilities improvements
x86:
- support for VMware magic I/O port and pseudo-PMCs
- AMD pause loop exiting
- support for AMD core performance extensions
- support for synchronous register access
- expose nVMX capabilities to userspace
- support for Hyper-V signaling via eventfd
- use Enlightened VMCS when running on Hyper-V
- allow userspace to disable MWAIT/HLT/PAUSE vmexits
- usual roundup of optimizations and nested virtualization bugfixes
Generic:
- API selftest infrastructure (though the only tests are for x86 as
of now)"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (174 commits)
kvm: x86: fix a prototype warning
kvm: selftests: add sync_regs_test
kvm: selftests: add API testing infrastructure
kvm: x86: fix a compile warning
KVM: X86: Add Force Emulation Prefix for "emulate the next instruction"
KVM: X86: Introduce handle_ud()
KVM: vmx: unify adjacent #ifdefs
x86: kvm: hide the unused 'cpu' variable
KVM: VMX: remove bogus WARN_ON in handle_ept_misconfig
Revert "KVM: X86: Fix SMRAM accessing even if VM is shutdown"
kvm: Add emulation for movups/movupd
KVM: VMX: raise internal error for exception during invalid protected mode state
KVM: nVMX: Optimization: Dont set KVM_REQ_EVENT when VMExit with nested_run_pending
KVM: nVMX: Require immediate-exit when event reinjected to L2 and L1 event pending
KVM: x86: Fix misleading comments on handling pending exceptions
KVM: x86: Rename interrupt.pending to interrupt.injected
KVM: VMX: No need to clear pending NMI/interrupt on inject realmode interrupt
x86/kvm: use Enlightened VMCS when running on Hyper-V
x86/hyper-v: detect nested features
x86/hyper-v: define struct hv_enlightened_vmcs and clean field bits
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"Nothing particularly stands out here, probably because people were
tied up with spectre/meltdown stuff last time around. Still, the main
pieces are:
- Rework of our CPU features framework so that we can whitelist CPUs
that don't require kpti even in a heterogeneous system
- Support for the IDC/DIC architecture extensions, which allow us to
elide instruction and data cache maintenance when writing out
instructions
- Removal of the large memory model which resulted in suboptimal
codegen by the compiler and increased the use of literal pools,
which could potentially be used as ROP gadgets since they are
mapped as executable
- Rework of forced signal delivery so that the siginfo_t is
well-formed and handling of show_unhandled_signals is consolidated
and made consistent between different fault types
- More siginfo cleanup based on the initial patches from Eric
Biederman
- Workaround for Cortex-A55 erratum #1024718
- Some small ACPI IORT updates and cleanups from Lorenzo Pieralisi
- Misc cleanups and non-critical fixes"
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (70 commits)
arm64: uaccess: Fix omissions from usercopy whitelist
arm64: fpsimd: Split cpu field out from struct fpsimd_state
arm64: tlbflush: avoid writing RES0 bits
arm64: cmpxchg: Include linux/compiler.h in asm/cmpxchg.h
arm64: move percpu cmpxchg implementation from cmpxchg.h to percpu.h
arm64: cmpxchg: Include build_bug.h instead of bug.h for BUILD_BUG
arm64: lse: Include compiler_types.h and export.h for out-of-line LL/SC
arm64: fpsimd: include <linux/init.h> in fpsimd.h
drivers/perf: arm_pmu_platform: do not warn about affinity on uniprocessor
perf: arm_spe: include linux/vmalloc.h for vmap()
Revert "arm64: Revert L1_CACHE_SHIFT back to 6 (64-byte cache line size)"
arm64: cpufeature: Avoid warnings due to unused symbols
arm64: Add work around for Arm Cortex-A55 Erratum 1024718
arm64: Delay enabling hardware DBM feature
arm64: Add MIDR encoding for Arm Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35
arm64: capabilities: Handle shared entries
arm64: capabilities: Add support for checks based on a list of MIDRs
arm64: Add helpers for checking CPU MIDR against a range
arm64: capabilities: Clean up midr range helpers
arm64: capabilities: Change scope of VHE to Boot CPU feature
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The usual pile of boring changes:
- Consolidate tasklet functions to share code instead of duplicating
it
- The first step for making the low level entry handler management on
multi-platform kernels generic
- A new sysfs file which allows to retrieve the wakeup state of
interrupts.
- Ensure that the interrupt thread follows the effective affinity and
not the programmed affinity to avoid cross core wakeups.
- Two new interrupt controller drivers (Microsemi Ocelot and Qualcomm
PDC)
- Fix the wakeup path clock handling for Reneasas interrupt chips.
- Rework the boot time register reset for ARM GIC-V2/3
- Better suspend/resume support for ARM GIV-V3/ITS
- Add missing locking to the ARM GIC set_type() callback
- Small fixes for the irq simulator code
- SPDX identifiers for the irq core code and removal of boiler plate
- Small cleanups all over the place"
* 'irq-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
openrisc: Set CONFIG_MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
arm64: Set CONFIG_MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
genirq: Make GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER depend on !MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
irqchip/gic: Take lock when updating irq type
irqchip/gic: Update supports_deactivate static key to modern api
irqchip/gic-v3: Ensure GICR_CTLR.EnableLPI=0 is observed before enabling
irqchip: Add a driver for the Microsemi Ocelot controller
dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: Add binding for the Microsemi Ocelot interrupt controller
irqchip/gic-v3: Probe for SCR_EL3 being clear before resetting AP0Rn
irqchip/gic-v3: Don't try to reset AP0Rn
irqchip/gic-v3: Do not check trigger configuration of partitionned LPIs
genirq: Remove license boilerplate/references
genirq: Add missing SPDX identifiers
genirq/matrix: Cleanup SPDX identifier
genirq: Cleanup top of file comments
genirq: Pass desc to __irq_free instead of irq number
irqchip/gic-v3: Loudly complain about the use of IRQ_TYPE_NONE
irqchip/gic: Loudly complain about the use of IRQ_TYPE_NONE
RISC-V: Move to the new GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER handler
genirq: Add CONFIG_GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER
...
|
|
When the hardend usercopy support was added for arm64, it was
concluded that all cases of usercopy into and out of thread_struct
were statically sized and so didn't require explicit whitelisting
of the appropriate fields in thread_struct.
Testing with usercopy hardening enabled has revealed that this is
not the case for certain ptrace regset manipulation calls on arm64.
This occurs because the sizes of usercopies associated with the
regset API are dynamic by construction, and because arm64 does not
always stage such copies via the stack: indeed the regset API is
designed to avoid the need for that by adding some bounds checking.
This is currently believed to affect only the fpsimd and TLS
registers.
Because the whitelisted fields in thread_struct must be contiguous,
this patch groups them together in a nested struct. It is also
necessary to be able to determine the location and size of that
struct, so rather than making the struct anonymous (which would
save on edits elsewhere) or adding an anonymous union containing
named and unnamed instances of the same struct (gross), this patch
gives the struct a name and makes the necessary edits to code that
references it (noisy but simple).
Care is needed to ensure that the new struct does not contain
padding (which the usercopy hardening would fail to protect).
For this reason, the presence of tp2_value is made unconditional,
since a padding field would be needed there in any case. This pads
up to the 16-byte alignment required by struct user_fpsimd_state.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Fixes: 9e8084d3f761 ("arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy")
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
In preparation for using a common representation of the FPSIMD
state for tasks and KVM vcpus, this patch separates out the "cpu"
field that is used to track the cpu on which the state was most
recently loaded.
This will allow common code to operate on task and vcpu contexts
without requiring the cpu field to be stored at the same offset
from the FPSIMD register data in both cases. This should avoid the
need for messing with the definition of those parts of struct
vcpu_arch that are exposed in the KVM user ABI.
The resulting change is also convenient for grouping and defining
the set of thread_struct fields that are supposed to be accessible
to copy_{to,from}_user(), which includes user_fpsimd_state but
should exclude the cpu field. This patch does not amend the
usercopy whitelist to match: that will be addressed in a subsequent
patch.
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[will: inline fpsimd_flush_state for now]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Several of the bits of the TLBI register operand are RES0 per the ARM
ARM, so TLBI operations should avoid writing non-zero values to these
bits.
This patch adds a macro __TLBI_VADDR(addr, asid) that creates the
operand register in the correct format and honors the RES0 bits.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Philip Elcan <pelcan@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Creates far too many conflicts with arm64/for-next/core, to be
resent post -rc1.
This reverts commit f9f5dc19509bbef6f5e675346f1a7d7b846bdb12.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
We need linux/compiler.h for unreachable(), so #include it here.
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We want to avoid pulling linux/preempt.h into cmpxchg.h, since that can
introduce a circular dependency on linux/bitops.h. linux/preempt.h is
only needed by the per-cpu cmpxchg implementation, which is better off
alongside the per-cpu xchg implementation in percpu.h, so move it there
and add the missing #include.
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Having asm/cmpxchg.h pull in linux/bug.h is problematic because this
ends up pulling in the atomic bitops which themselves may be built on
top of atomic.h and cmpxchg.h.
Instead, just include build_bug.h for the definition of BUILD_BUG.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
When the LL/SC atomics are moved out-of-line, they are annotated as
notrace and exported to modules. Ensure we pull in the relevant include
files so that these macros are defined when we need them.
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
fpsimd.h uses the __init annotation, so pull in linux/init.h
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
This reverts commit 1f85b42a691cd8329ba82dbcaeec80ac1231b32a.
The internal dma-direct.h API has changed in -next, which collides with
us trying to use it to manage non-coherent DMA devices on systems with
unreasonably large cache writeback granules.
This isn't at all trivial to resolve, so revert our changes for now and
we can revisit this after the merge window. Effectively, this just
restores our behaviour back to that of 4.16.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We enable hardware DBM bit in a capable CPU, very early in the
boot via __cpu_setup. This doesn't give us a flexibility of
optionally disable the feature, as the clearing the bit
is a bit costly as the TLB can cache the settings. Instead,
we delay enabling the feature until the CPU is brought up
into the kernel. We use the feature capability mechanism
to handle it.
The hardware DBM is a non-conflicting feature. i.e, the kernel
can safely run with a mix of CPUs with some using the feature
and the others don't. So, it is safe for a late CPU to have
this capability and enable it, even if the active CPUs don't.
To get this handled properly by the infrastructure, we
unconditionally set the capability and only enable it
on CPUs which really have the feature. Also, we print the
feature detection from the "matches" call back to make sure
we don't mislead the user when none of the CPUs could use the
feature.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Update the MIDR encodings for the Cortex-A55 and Cortex-A35
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Some capabilities have different criteria for detection and associated
actions based on the matching criteria, even though they all share the
same capability bit. So far we have used multiple entries with the same
capability bit to handle this. This is prone to errors, as the
cpu_enable is invoked for each entry, irrespective of whether the
detection rule applies to the CPU or not. And also this complicates
other helpers, e.g, __this_cpu_has_cap.
This patch adds a wrapper entry to cover all the possible variations
of a capability by maintaining list of matches + cpu_enable callbacks.
To avoid complicating the prototypes for the "matches()", we use
arm64_cpu_capabilities maintain the list and we ignore all the other
fields except the matches & cpu_enable.
This ensures :
1) The capabilitiy is set when at least one of the entry detects
2) Action is only taken for the entries that "matches".
This avoids explicit checks in the cpu_enable() take some action.
The only constraint here is that, all the entries should have the
same "type" (i.e, scope and conflict rules).
If a cpu_enable() method is associated with multiple matches for a
single capability, care should be taken that either the match criteria
are mutually exclusive, or that the method is robust against being
called multiple times.
This also reverts the changes introduced by commit 67948af41f2e6818ed
("arm64: capabilities: Handle duplicate entries for a capability").
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Add helpers for detecting an errata on list of midr ranges
of affected CPUs, with the same work around.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Add helpers for checking if the given CPU midr falls in a range
of variants/revisions for a given model.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We expect all CPUs to be running at the same EL inside the kernel
with or without VHE enabled and we have strict checks to ensure
that any mismatch triggers a kernel panic. If VHE is enabled,
we use the feature based on the boot CPU and all other CPUs
should follow. This makes it a perfect candidate for a capability
based on the boot CPU, which should be matched by all the CPUs
(both when is ON and OFF). This saves us some not-so-pretty
hooks and special code, just for verifying the conflict.
The patch also makes the VHE capability entry depend on
CONFIG_ARM64_VHE.
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
The kernel detects and uses some of the features based on the boot
CPU and expects that all the following CPUs conform to it. e.g,
with VHE and the boot CPU running at EL2, the kernel decides to
keep the kernel running at EL2. If another CPU is brought up without
this capability, we use custom hooks (via check_early_cpu_features())
to handle it. To handle such capabilities add support for detecting
and enabling capabilities based on the boot CPU.
A bit is added to indicate if the capability should be detected
early on the boot CPU. The infrastructure then ensures that such
capabilities are probed and "enabled" early on in the boot CPU
and, enabled on the subsequent CPUs.
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
KPTI is treated as a system wide feature and is only detected if all
the CPUs in the sysetm needs the defense, unless it is forced via kernel
command line. This leaves a system with a mix of CPUs with and without
the defense vulnerable. Also, if a late CPU needs KPTI but KPTI was not
activated at boot time, the CPU is currently allowed to boot, which is a
potential security vulnerability.
This patch ensures that the KPTI is turned on if at least one CPU detects
the capability (i.e, change scope to SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU). Also rejetcs a late
CPU, if it requires the defense, when the system hasn't enabled it,
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Now that we have the flexibility of defining system features based
on individual CPUs, introduce CPU feature type that can be detected
on a local SCOPE and ignores the conflict on late CPUs. This is
applicable for ARM64_HAS_NO_HW_PREFETCH, where it is fine for
the system to have CPUs without hardware prefetch turning up
later. We only suffer a performance penalty, nothing fatal.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
While processing the list of capabilities, it is useful to
filter out some of the entries based on the given mask for the
scope of the capabilities to allow better control. This can be
used later for handling LOCAL vs SYSTEM wide capabilities and more.
All capabilities should have their scope set to either LOCAL_CPU or
SYSTEM. No functional/flow change.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
When a CPU is brought up, it is checked against the caps that are
known to be enabled on the system (via verify_local_cpu_capabilities()).
Based on the state of the capability on the CPU vs. that of System we
could have the following combinations of conflict.
x-----------------------------x
| Type | System | Late CPU |
|-----------------------------|
| a | y | n |
|-----------------------------|
| b | n | y |
x-----------------------------x
Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the
system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for
all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain
filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as
long as the system already enables it.
Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds that cannot be activated
after the kernel has finished booting.And we ignore (b) for features. Here,
yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we are too
late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs etc).
Add two different flags to indicate how the conflict should be handled.
ARM64_CPUCAP_PERMITTED_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may have the capability
ARM64_CPUCAP_OPTIONAL_FOR_LATE_CPU - CPUs may not have the cappability.
Now that we have the flags to describe the behavior of the errata and
the features, as we treat them, define types for ERRATUM and FEATURE.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We use arm64_cpu_capabilities to represent CPU ELF HWCAPs exposed
to the userspace and the CPU hwcaps used by the kernel, which
include cpu features and CPU errata work arounds. Capabilities
have some properties that decide how they should be treated :
1) Detection, i.e scope : A cap could be "detected" either :
- if it is present on at least one CPU (SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
Or
- if it is present on all the CPUs (SCOPE_SYSTEM)
2) When is it enabled ? - A cap is treated as "enabled" when the
system takes some action based on whether the capability is detected or
not. e.g, setting some control register, patching the kernel code.
Right now, we treat all caps are enabled at boot-time, after all
the CPUs are brought up by the kernel. But there are certain caps,
which are enabled early during the boot (e.g, VHE, GIC_CPUIF for NMI)
and kernel starts using them, even before the secondary CPUs are brought
up. We would need a way to describe this for each capability.
3) Conflict on a late CPU - When a CPU is brought up, it is checked
against the caps that are known to be enabled on the system (via
verify_local_cpu_capabilities()). Based on the state of the capability
on the CPU vs. that of System we could have the following combinations
of conflict.
x-----------------------------x
| Type | System | Late CPU |
------------------------------|
| a | y | n |
------------------------------|
| b | n | y |
x-----------------------------x
Case (a) is not permitted for caps which are system features, which the
system expects all the CPUs to have (e.g VHE). While (a) is ignored for
all errata work arounds. However, there could be exceptions to the plain
filtering approach. e.g, KPTI is an optional feature for a late CPU as
long as the system already enables it.
Case (b) is not permitted for errata work arounds which requires some
work around, which cannot be delayed. And we ignore (b) for features.
Here, yet again, KPTI is an exception, where if a late CPU needs KPTI we
are too late to enable it (because we change the allocation of ASIDs
etc).
So this calls for a lot more fine grained behavior for each capability.
And if we define all the attributes to control their behavior properly,
we may be able to use a single table for the CPU hwcaps (which cover
errata and features, not the ELF HWCAPs). This is a prepartory step
to get there. More bits would be added for the properties listed above.
We are going to use a bit-mask to encode all the properties of a
capabilities. This patch encodes the "SCOPE" of the capability.
As such there is no change in how the capabilities are treated.
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We have errata work around processing code in cpu_errata.c,
which calls back into helpers defined in cpufeature.c. Now
that we are going to make the handling of capabilities
generic, by adding the information to each capability,
move the errata work around specific processing code.
No functional changes.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We issue the enable() call back for all CPU hwcaps capabilities
available on the system, on all the CPUs. So far we have ignored
the argument passed to the call back, which had a prototype to
accept a "void *" for use with on_each_cpu() and later with
stop_machine(). However, with commit 0a0d111d40fd1
("arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback"),
there are some users of the argument who wants the matching capability
struct pointer where there are multiple matching criteria for a single
capability. Clean up the declaration of the call back to make it clear.
1) Renamed to cpu_enable(), to imply taking necessary actions on the
called CPU for the entry.
2) Pass const pointer to the capability, to allow the call back to
check the entry. (e.,g to check if any action is needed on the CPU)
3) We don't care about the result of the call back, turning this to
a void.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
[suzuki: convert more users, rename call back and drop results]
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We would like to reset the Group-0 Active Priority Registers
at boot time if they are available to us. They would be available
if SCR_EL3.FIQ was not set, but we cannot directly probe this bit,
and short of checking, we may end-up trapping to EL3, and the
firmware may not be please to get such an exception. Yes, this
is dumb.
Instead, let's use PMR to find out if its value gets affected by
SCR_EL3.FIQ being set. We use the fact that when SCR_EL3.FIQ is
set, the LSB of the priority is lost due to the shifting back and
forth of the actual priority. If we read back a 0, we know that
Group0 is unavailable. In case we read a non-zero value, we can
safely reset the AP0Rn register.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Currently a SIGFPE delivered in response to a floating-point
exception trap may have si_code set to 0 on arm64. As reported by
Eric, this is a bad idea since this is the value of SI_USER -- yet
this signal is definitely not the result of kill(2), tgkill(2) etc.
and si_uid and si_pid make limited sense whereas we do want to
yield a value for si_addr (which doesn't exist for SI_USER).
It's not entirely clear whether the architecure permits a
"spurious" fp exception trap where none of the exception flag bits
in ESR_ELx is set. (IMHO the architectural intent is to forbid
this.) However, it does permit those bits to contain garbage if
the TFV bit in ESR_ELx is 0. That case isn't currently handled at
all and may result in si_code == 0 or si_code containing a FPE_FLT*
constant corresponding to an exception that did not in fact happen.
There is nothing sensible we can return for si_code in such cases,
but SI_USER is certainly not appropriate and will lead to violation
of legitimate userspace assumptions.
This patch allocates a new si_code value FPE_UNKNOWN that at least
does not conflict with any existing SI_* or FPE_* code, and yields
this in si_code for undiagnosable cases. This is probably the best
simplicity/incorrectness tradeoff achieveable without relying on
implementation-dependent features or adding a lot of code. In any
case, there appears to be no perfect solution possible that would
justify a lot of effort here.
Yielding FPE_UNKNOWN when some well-defined fp exception caused the
trap is a violation of POSIX, but this is forced by the
architecture. We have no realistic prospect of yielding the
correct code in such cases. At present I am not aware of any ARMv8
implementation that supports trapped floating-point exceptions in
any case.
The new code may be applicable to other architectures for similar
reasons.
No attempt is made to provide ESR_ELx to userspace in the signal
frame, since architectural limitations mean that it is unlikely to
provide much diagnostic value, doesn't benefit existing software
and would create ABI with no proven purpose. The existing
mechanism for passing it also has problems of its own which may
result in the wrong value being passed to userspace due to
interaction with mm faults. The implied rework does not appear
justified.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC
V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses
the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead
of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Expose the new features introduced by Arm v8.4 extensions to
Arm v8-A profile.
These include :
1) Data indpendent timing of instructions. (DIT, exposed as HWCAP_DIT)
2) Unaligned atomic instructions and Single-copy atomicity of loads
and stores. (AT, expose as HWCAP_USCAT)
3) LDAPR and STLR instructions with immediate offsets (extension to
LRCPC, exposed as HWCAP_ILRCPC)
4) Flag manipulation instructions (TS, exposed as HWCAP_FLAGM).
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
Now that we started keeping modules within 4 GB of the core kernel
in all cases, we no longer need to special case the adr_l/ldr_l/str_l
macros for modules to deal with them being loaded farther away.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
|
|
We're now ready to map our vectors in weird and wonderful locations.
On enabling ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS, a vector slot gets allocated
if this hasn't been already done via ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
and gets mapped outside of the normal RAM region, next to the
idmap.
That way, being able to obtain VBAR_EL2 doesn't reveal the mapping
of the rest of the hypervisor code.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
We're about to need to allocate hardening slots from other parts
of the kernel (in order to support ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS).
Turn the counter into an atomic_t and make it available to the
rest of the kernel. Also add BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS as the number of
slots instead of the hardcoded 4...
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Until now, all EL2 executable mappings were derived from their
EL1 VA. Since we want to decouple the vectors mapping from
the rest of the hypervisor, we need to be able to map some
text somewhere else.
The "idmap" region (for lack of a better name) is ideally suited
for this, as we have a huge range that hardly has anything in it.
Let's extend the IO allocator to also deal with executable mappings,
thus providing the required feature.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
So far, the branch from the vector slots to the main vectors can at
most be 4GB from the main vectors (the reach of ADRP), and this
distance is known at compile time. If we were to remap the slots
to an unrelated VA, things would break badly.
A way to achieve VA independence would be to load the absolute
address of the vectors (__kvm_hyp_vector), either using a constant
pool or a series of movs, followed by an indirect branch.
This patches implements the latter solution, using another instance
of a patching callback. Note that since we have to save a register
pair on the stack, we branch to the *second* instruction in the
vectors in order to compensate for it. This also results in having
to adjust this balance in the invalid vector entry point.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
There is no reason why the BP hardening vectors shouldn't be part
of the HYP text at compile time, rather than being mapped at runtime.
Also introduce a new config symbol that controls the compilation
of bpi.S.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
We currently provide the hyp-init code with a kernel VA, and expect
it to turn it into a HYP va by itself. As we're about to provide
the hypervisor with mappings that are not necessarily in the memory
range, let's move the kern_hyp_va macro to kvm_get_hyp_vector.
No functionnal change.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
The main idea behind randomising the EL2 VA is that we usually have
a few spare bits between the most significant bit of the VA mask
and the most significant bit of the linear mapping.
Those bits could be a bunch of zeroes, and could be useful
to move things around a bit. Of course, the more memory you have,
the less randomisation you get...
Alternatively, these bits could be the result of KASLR, in which
case they are already random. But it would be nice to have a
*different* randomization, just to make the job of a potential
attacker a bit more difficult.
Inserting these random bits is a bit involved. We don't have a spare
register (short of rewriting all the kern_hyp_va call sites), and
the immediate we want to insert is too random to be used with the
ORR instruction. The best option I could come up with is the following
sequence:
and x0, x0, #va_mask
ror x0, x0, #first_random_bit
add x0, x0, #(random & 0xfff)
add x0, x0, #(random >> 12), lsl #12
ror x0, x0, #(63 - first_random_bit)
making it a fairly long sequence, but one that a decent CPU should
be able to execute without breaking a sweat. It is of course NOPed
out on VHE. The last 4 instructions can also be turned into NOPs
if it appears that there is no free bits to use.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Add an encoder for the EXTR instruction, which also implements the ROR
variant (where Rn == Rm).
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
As we're about to change the way we map devices at HYP, we need
to move away from kern_hyp_va on an IO address.
One way of achieving this is to store the VAs in kvm_vgic_global_state,
and use that directly from the HYP code. This requires a small change
to create_hyp_io_mappings so that it can also return a HYP VA.
We take this opportunity to nuke the vctrl_base field in the emulated
distributor, as it is not used anymore.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Both HYP io mappings call ioremap, followed by create_hyp_io_mappings.
Let's move the ioremap call into create_hyp_io_mappings itself, which
simplifies the code a bit and allows for further refactoring.
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
kvm_vgic_global_state is part of the read-only section, and is
usually accessed using a PC-relative address generation (adrp + add).
It is thus useless to use kern_hyp_va() on it, and actively problematic
if kern_hyp_va() becomes non-idempotent. On the other hand, there is
no way that the compiler is going to guarantee that such access is
always PC relative.
So let's bite the bullet and provide our own accessor.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|
|
Now that we can dynamically compute the kernek/hyp VA mask, there
is no need for a feature flag to trigger the alternative patching.
Let's drop the flag and everything that depends on it.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
|