summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c3
-rw-r--r--security/security.c1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c46
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/avc.h6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/flask.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c85
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c269
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c144
19 files changed, 500 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 384379ede4fd..338606eb7238 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
- current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
+ set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 8ffd76405b5b..19d813d5e083 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static void dummy_bprm_free_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) {
- current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
+ set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
if ((unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
@@ -420,8 +420,12 @@ static int dummy_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int command,
static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags)
+ unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long addr_only)
{
+ if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+ return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 700400d801dc..01bbc6d9d19b 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
{
/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
- 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/* add the special key types */
list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index f573ac189a0a..557500110a13 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -108,7 +108,8 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key *key,
argv[i] = NULL;
/* do it */
- ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(argv[0], argv, envp, keyring, 1);
+ ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(argv[0], argv, envp, keyring,
+ UMH_WAIT_PROC);
error_link:
key_put(keyring);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index fc8601b2b7ac..27e5863d30f1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
struct security_operations *security_ops; /* Initialized to NULL */
+unsigned long mmap_min_addr; /* 0 means no protection */
static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index e4396a89edc6..ecd067384531 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
}
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
}
}
if (inode)
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%ld",
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
inode->i_sb->s_id,
inode->i_ino);
break;
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
* @avd: access vector decisions
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
@@ -846,8 +847,9 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
* should be released for the auditing.
*/
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ unsigned flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
@@ -874,7 +876,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
if (!requested || denied) {
- if (selinux_enforcing)
+ if (selinux_enforcing || (flags & AVC_STRICT))
rc = -EACCES;
else
if (node)
@@ -909,7 +911,7 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
struct av_decision avd;
int rc;
- rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd);
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ad8dd4e8657e..0fac6829c63a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1592,9 +1592,10 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
if (rc == 0)
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
- CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
- NULL);
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+ 0,
+ NULL);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2317,7 +2318,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value
if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+ if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
return -EPERM;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
@@ -2568,12 +2569,16 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
}
static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
{
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
+ u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
- if (rc)
+ if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+ MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
+ if (rc || addr_only)
return rc;
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
@@ -3124,17 +3129,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
/**
* selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
* @skb: the packet
- * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only external labels
* @sid: the packet's SID
*
* Description:
* Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
- * the external SID for the packet.
+ * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
+ * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
+ * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
+ * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
+ * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
+ * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
*
*/
-static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
- u32 base_sid,
- u32 *sid)
+static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
{
u32 xfrm_sid;
u32 nlbl_sid;
@@ -3142,10 +3149,9 @@ static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb,
selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
(xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
- base_sid : xfrm_sid),
+ SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
&nlbl_sid) != 0)
nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
*sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
}
@@ -3690,7 +3696,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peer_secid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -3751,7 +3757,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 newsid;
u32 peersid;
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &peersid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
req->secid = sksec->sid;
req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -3789,7 +3795,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, &sksec->peer_sid);
+ selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
@@ -4626,7 +4632,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
if (!error)
tsec->sid = sid;
task_unlock(p);
@@ -4907,7 +4913,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index b83e74012a97..049bf69429b6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -158,3 +158,4 @@
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, "create")
S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind")
S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect")
+ S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 5fee1735bffe..eda89a2ec635 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -823,3 +823,4 @@
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL
#define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x00800000UL
+#define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO 0x00000001UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 6ed10c3d3339..e145f6e13b0b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- struct av_decision *avd);
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ unsigned flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd);
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 378799068441..e77de0e62ea0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@
S_("key")
S_(NULL)
S_("dccp_socket")
+ S_("memprotect")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 35f309f47873..a9c2b20f14b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#define SECCLASS_PACKET 57
#define SECCLASS_KEY 58
#define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 60
+#define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61
/*
* Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b94378afea25..83bdd4d2a29e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len);
+#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
u32 decided;
@@ -87,6 +88,9 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK 3 /* use task SIDs, e.g. pipefs/sockfs */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index bf8750791dd1..051b14c88e2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
#include "security.h"
/**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
- * @sock: the socket to label
+ * selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism
+ * @sk: the socket to label
* @sid: the SID to use
*
* Description:
@@ -47,17 +47,17 @@
* this function and rcu_read_unlock() after this function returns.
*
*/
-static int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(struct socket *sock, u32 sid)
+static int selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(struct sock *sk, u32 sid)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, &secattr);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = netlbl_socket_setattr(sock, &secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
if (rc == 0) {
spin_lock_bh(&sksec->nlbl_lock);
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -155,12 +155,15 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ if (!netlbl_enabled()) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
- rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
- base_sid,
- sid);
+ rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -198,7 +201,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
- SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+ SECINITSID_NETMSG,
&nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
/* Try to set the NetLabel on the socket to save time later, if we fail
* here we will pick up the pieces in later calls to
* selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(). */
- selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
+ selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -223,14 +226,15 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
{
int rc = 0;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
rcu_read_lock();
if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE)
- rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;
@@ -251,14 +255,16 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock)
int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int rc;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+ struct sock *sk;
struct socket *sock;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode) ||
((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)) == 0))
return 0;
sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
- sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sk = sock->sk;
+ sksec = sk->sk_security;
rcu_read_lock();
if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) {
@@ -266,9 +272,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return 0;
}
local_bh_disable();
- bh_lock_sock_nested(sock->sk);
- rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_setsid(sock, sksec->sid);
- bh_unlock_sock(sock->sk);
+ bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid);
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -292,38 +298,42 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
{
int rc;
- u32 netlbl_sid;
- u32 recv_perm;
+ u32 nlbl_sid;
+ u32 perm;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
- SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
- &netlbl_sid);
+ if (!netlbl_enabled())
+ return 0;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+ rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
+ SECINITSID_NETMSG,
+ &nlbl_sid);
+ else
+ nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
- return 0;
-
switch (sksec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
- recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
- recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
break;
default:
- recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+ perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
- netlbl_sid,
- sksec->sclass,
- recv_perm,
- ad);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
if (rc == 0)
return 0;
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+ if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
return rc;
}
@@ -345,14 +355,17 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int optname)
{
int rc = 0;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
rcu_read_lock();
if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- rc = netlbl_socket_getattr(sock, &secattr);
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
+ release_sock(sk);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
rc = -EACCES;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index ccfe8755735e..eddc7b420109 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index aca099aa2ed3..c9e92daedee2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
static int bool_num = 0;
static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
+/* global data for classes */
+static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL;
+static unsigned long last_class_ino;
+
extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */
@@ -106,6 +110,7 @@ static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000
#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000
+#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000
#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff
#define TMPBUFLEN 12
@@ -237,6 +242,11 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
/* declaration for sel_write_load */
static int sel_make_bools(void);
+static int sel_make_classes(void);
+
+/* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned long *ino);
static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -287,10 +297,18 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
goto out;
ret = sel_make_bools();
+ if (ret) {
+ length = ret;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_classes();
if (ret)
length = ret;
else
length = count;
+
+out1:
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
"policy loaded auid=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
@@ -940,9 +958,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
.write = sel_commit_bools_write,
};
-/* delete booleans - partial revoke() from
- * fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
-static void sel_remove_bools(struct dentry *de)
+/* partial revoke() from fs/proc/generic.c proc_kill_inodes */
+static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
{
struct list_head *p, *node;
struct super_block *sb = de->d_sb;
@@ -998,7 +1015,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
kfree(bool_pending_values);
bool_pending_values = NULL;
- sel_remove_bools(dir);
+ sel_remove_entries(dir);
if (!(page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1048,7 +1065,7 @@ out:
return ret;
err:
kfree(values);
- sel_remove_bools(dir);
+ sel_remove_entries(dir);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
@@ -1294,7 +1311,227 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
+{
+ return a / b - (a % b < 0);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
+{
+ return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1) + perm) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
+}
+
+static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
+{
+ return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) % (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ ssize_t rc, len;
+ char *page;
+ unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_class,
+};
+
+static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file * file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ ssize_t rc, len;
+ char *page;
+ unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+
+ page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE,"%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
+ free_page((unsigned long)page);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_perm,
+};
+
+static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ int i, rc = 0, nperms;
+ char **perms;
+
+ rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, perms[i]);
+ if (!dentry) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
+ /* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+ inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+ }
+
+out1:
+ for (i = 0; i < nperms; i++)
+ kfree(perms[i]);
+ kfree(perms);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
+ struct dentry *dir)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "index");
+ if (!dentry) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ if (!inode) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
+ inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
+ d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, "perms");
+ if (!dentry) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = sel_make_dir(dir->d_inode, dentry, &last_class_ino);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = sel_make_perm_files(classname, index, dentry);
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void sel_remove_classes(void)
+{
+ struct list_head *class_node;
+
+ list_for_each(class_node, &class_dir->d_subdirs) {
+ struct dentry *class_subdir = list_entry(class_node,
+ struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
+ struct list_head *class_subdir_node;
+
+ list_for_each(class_subdir_node, &class_subdir->d_subdirs) {
+ struct dentry *d = list_entry(class_subdir_node,
+ struct dentry, d_u.d_child);
+
+ if (d->d_inode)
+ if (d->d_inode->i_mode & S_IFDIR)
+ sel_remove_entries(d);
+ }
+
+ sel_remove_entries(class_subdir);
+ }
+
+ sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
+}
+
+static int sel_make_classes(void)
+{
+ int rc = 0, nclasses, i;
+ char **classes;
+
+ /* delete any existing entries */
+ sel_remove_classes();
+
+ rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+ last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
+ struct dentry *class_name_dir;
+
+ class_name_dir = d_alloc_name(class_dir, classes[i]);
+ if (!class_name_dir) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ rc = sel_make_dir(class_dir->d_inode, class_name_dir,
+ &last_class_ino);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out1;
+
+ /* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
+ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i+1,
+ class_name_dir);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+out1:
+ for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++)
+ kfree(classes[i]);
+ kfree(classes);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned long *ino)
{
int ret = 0;
struct inode *inode;
@@ -1306,7 +1543,7 @@ static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
}
inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
- inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+ inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
inc_nlink(inode);
d_add(dentry, inode);
@@ -1352,7 +1589,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
goto err;
}
- ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
goto err;
@@ -1385,7 +1622,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
goto err;
}
- ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
goto err;
@@ -1399,7 +1636,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
goto err;
}
- ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
if (ret)
goto err;
@@ -1407,6 +1644,18 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
if (ret)
goto err;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "class");
+ if (!dentry) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ class_dir = dentry;
+
out:
return ret;
err:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 3122908afdc1..85705eb289e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
{
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
sizeof(struct avtab_node),
- 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 0ac1021734c0..f05f97a2bc3a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -598,6 +599,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
struct range_trans *rt, *lrt = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
}
@@ -612,6 +614,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
c = p->ocontexts[i];
while (c) {
ctmp = c;
@@ -623,6 +626,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
g = p->genfs;
while (g) {
+ cond_resched();
kfree(g->fstype);
c = g->head;
while (c) {
@@ -639,18 +643,21 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
cond_policydb_destroy(p);
for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
+ cond_resched();
kfree(ltr);
ltr = tr;
}
kfree(ltr);
for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra -> next) {
+ cond_resched();
kfree(lra);
lra = ra;
}
kfree(lra);
for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) {
+ cond_resched();
if (lrt) {
ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 40660ffd49b6..b5f017f07a75 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1587,19 +1587,18 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
u32 *nel)
{
struct context *fromcon, usercon;
- u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
struct user_datum *user;
struct role_datum *role;
- struct av_decision avd;
struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
int rc = 0, i, j;
- if (!ss_initialized) {
- *sids = NULL;
- *nel = 0;
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
goto out;
- }
POLICY_RDLOCK;
@@ -1635,17 +1634,9 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
- rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
- SECCLASS_PROCESS,
- PROCESS__TRANSITION,
- &avd);
- if (rc || !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
- continue;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
- if (rc) {
- kfree(mysids);
+ if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
- }
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
@@ -1653,7 +1644,6 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids2) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
- kfree(mysids);
goto out_unlock;
}
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
@@ -1664,11 +1654,32 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
}
}
- *sids = mysids;
- *nel = mynel;
-
out_unlock:
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ if (rc || !mynel) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+ NULL);
+ if (!rc)
+ mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ kfree(mysids);
+ *sids = mysids2;
+ *nel = j;
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -1996,6 +2007,101 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct class_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **classes = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!classes[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+ int rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+ *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*classes)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+ *classes);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ kfree((*classes)[i]);
+ kfree(*classes);
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **perms = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!perms[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+ int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
+ struct class_datum *match;
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+ if (!match) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, class);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+ *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(*perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*perms)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (match->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+ get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+ *perms);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return rc;
+
+err:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+ kfree((*perms)[i]);
+ kfree(*perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
struct selinux_audit_rule {
u32 au_seqno;
struct context au_ctxt;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-02 17:38:48 +0000