18 files changed, 134 insertions, 91 deletions

diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 22e73a3482bd..3baf435de541 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)		+= loadpin/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)       += safesetid/
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)	+= lockdown/
-obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS)			+= device_cgroup.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)			+= bpf/
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 280741fc0f5f..f6a3ecfadf80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
 	 */
 	error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask);
 	if (error)
-		return error;
+		goto end_section;
 
 	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos);
 	error = PTR_ERR(data);
@@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
 		error = aa_replace_profiles(ns, label, mask, data);
 		aa_put_loaddata(data);
 	}
+end_section:
 	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 
 	return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 5a98661a8b46..597732503815 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -197,8 +197,9 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
 				     GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
 		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
-		return PTR_ERR(rule->label);
+		return err;
 	}
 
 	*vrule = rule;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6ceb74e0f789..a84ef030fbd7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -1328,6 +1328,7 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 		ctx->nnp = aa_get_label(label);
 
 	if (!fqname || !*fqname) {
+		aa_put_label(label);
 		AA_DEBUG("no profile name");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1346,8 +1347,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags)
 			op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
 	}
 
-	label = aa_get_current_label();
-
 	if (*fqname == '&') {
 		stack = true;
 		/* don't have label_parse() do stacking */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f4ee0ae106b2..0ca31c8bc0b1 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	int ret;
 	kuid_t root_uid;
 
+	new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;
 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 7d0f8f7431ff..43ab0ad45c1b 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
 
 enum devcg_behavior {
@@ -792,7 +794,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
 };
 
 /**
- * __devcgroup_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
+ * devcgroup_legacy_check_permission - checks if an inode operation is permitted
  * @dev_cgroup: the dev cgroup to be tested against
  * @type: device type
  * @major: device major number
@@ -801,7 +803,7 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
  *
  * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
  */
-static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+static int devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
 					short access)
 {
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
@@ -825,6 +827,10 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF)
+
 int devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
 {
 	int rc = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_DEVICE_CGROUP(type, major, minor, access);
@@ -832,6 +838,13 @@ int devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, short access)
 	if (rc)
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, major, minor, access);
+	#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE
+	return devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(type, major, minor, access);
+
+	#else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
+	return 0;
+
+	#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE */
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(devcgroup_check_permission);
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF) */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 35682852ddea..764b896cd628 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 {
 	long rc;
 	const char *algo;
-	struct crypto_shash **tfm;
+	struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 
 	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
@@ -91,31 +91,31 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
 		algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
 	}
 
-	if (*tfm == NULL) {
-		mutex_lock(&mutex);
-		if (*tfm)
-			goto out;
-		*tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
-		if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
-			rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
-			pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
-			*tfm = NULL;
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto alloc;
+	mutex_lock(&mutex);
+	if (*tfm)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
+		       PTR_ERR(tmp_tfm));
+		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+		return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
+	}
+	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
 			mutex_unlock(&mutex);
 			return ERR_PTR(rc);
 		}
-		if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
-			rc = crypto_shash_setkey(*tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
-			if (rc) {
-				crypto_free_shash(*tfm);
-				*tfm = NULL;
-				mutex_unlock(&mutex);
-				return ERR_PTR(rc);
-			}
-		}
-out:
-		mutex_unlock(&mutex);
 	}
-
+	*tfm = tmp_tfm;
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mutex);
+alloc:
 	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!desc)
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
 	data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
 
 	error = -ENODATA;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		bool is_ima = false;
 
 		if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
 		if (error < 0) {
 			if (error == -ENODATA)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
 	struct xattr_list *xattr;
 
 	namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
 		    && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
 			found = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	/* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
+	/*
+	 * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+	 * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+	 * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+	 * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+	 * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+	 * and evm_protected_xattr().
+	 */
 	mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
 	list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
 		if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 423c84f95a14..88b5e288f241 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 	loff_t i_size;
 	int rc;
 	struct file *f = file;
-	bool new_file_instance = false, modified_flags = false;
+	bool new_file_instance = false, modified_mode = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 		f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
 		if (IS_ERR(f)) {
 			/*
-			 * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_flags
+			 * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_mode
 			 * of original and continue
 			 */
 			pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
 			f = file;
-			f->f_flags |= FMODE_READ;
-			modified_flags = true;
+			f->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+			modified_mode = true;
 		} else {
 			new_file_instance = true;
 		}
@@ -455,8 +455,8 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
 out:
 	if (new_file_instance)
 		fput(f);
-	else if (modified_flags)
-		f->f_flags &= ~FMODE_READ;
+	else if (modified_mode)
+		f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index a71e822a6e92..3efc8308ad26 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
 				    "policy_update", "signed policy required",
 				    1, 0);
-		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
-			result = -EACCES;
+		result = -EACCES;
 	} else {
 		result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
 	}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index f6797ba44bf7..14cf81d1a30b 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -323,19 +323,6 @@ error:
 	return ukey;
 }
 
-static int calc_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, u8 *digest,
-		     const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
-{
-	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
-	int err;
-
-	desc->tfm = tfm;
-
-	err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, buf, buflen, digest);
-	shash_desc_zero(desc);
-	return err;
-}
-
 static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
 		     const u8 *buf, unsigned int buflen)
 {
@@ -351,7 +338,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen,
 
 	err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
 	if (!err)
-		err = calc_hash(tfm, digest, buf, buflen);
+		err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, buf, buflen, digest);
 	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -381,7 +368,8 @@ static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 
 	memcpy(derived_buf + strlen(derived_buf) + 1, master_key,
 	       master_keylen);
-	ret = calc_hash(hash_tfm, derived_key, derived_buf, derived_buf_len);
+	ret = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hash_tfm, derived_buf, derived_buf_len,
+				      derived_key);
 	kzfree(derived_buf);
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 415f3f1c2da0..d0cde6685627 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 	n = key_serial_next(p, v);
 	if (n)
 		*_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+	else
+		(*_pos)++;
 	return n;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7fed24b9d57e..51de970fbb1e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1965,8 +1965,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
 
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
-				seclen);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
+	 * LSM hook is not "stackable").
+	 */
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
+		rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+		if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0b4e32161b77..4c037c2545c1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5842,40 +5842,60 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
 
 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int err = 0;
-	u32 perm;
+	int rc = 0;
+	unsigned int msg_len;
+	unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
+	unsigned char *data = skb->data;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	u32 perm;
 
-	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
-		err = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+	while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
+		nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
+
+		/* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
+		 *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
+		 *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
+		 *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
+		 *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
+		 */
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
+			return 0;
 
-	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
-	if (err) {
-		if (err == -EINVAL) {
+		rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		} else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+			/* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
-			       " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
-			       " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
-			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
-			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
-			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-			if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
-			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
-				err = 0;
+				" message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
+				" pid=%d comm=%s\n",
+				sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+				secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
+				task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
+			if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
+			    !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
+				return rc;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
+			/* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			return rc;
 		}
 
-		/* Ignore */
-		if (err == -ENOENT)
-			err = 0;
-		goto out;
+		/* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
+		msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
+		if (msg_len >= data_len)
+			return 0;
+		data_len -= msg_len;
+		data += msg_len;
 	}
 
-	err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
-out:
-	return err;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 986f3ac14282..d233ab3f1533 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
 	    "audit_control", "setfcap"
 
 #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS  "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
-		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+		"wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon"
 
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON
 #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 939a74fd8fb4..da94a1b4bfda 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!p->cond_list)
-		return rc;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
 	if (rc)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 70ecdc78efbd..c21b922e5ebe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1035,14 +1035,14 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
 	if (!str)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	/* it's expected the caller should free the str */
-	*strp = str;
-
 	rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
-	if (rc)
+	if (rc) {
+		kfree(str);
 		return rc;
+	}
 
 	str[len] = '\0';
+	*strp = str;
 	return 0;
 }