diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 1 |
2 files changed, 26 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index af4c979b38ee..269967c4fc1b 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK menu "Memory initialization" -config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT +config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern) +config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO + def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang) + choice prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry" default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS - default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT + default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN default INIT_STACK_NONE help This option enables initialization of stack variables at @@ -88,9 +91,9 @@ choice of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures. - config INIT_STACK_ALL + config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)" - depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT + depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN help Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes @@ -98,6 +101,24 @@ choice exposures, even variables that were warned to have been left uninitialized. + Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs + related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive + non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big. + + config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO + bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)" + depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO + help + Initializes everything on the stack with a zero + value. This is intended to eliminate all classes + of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information + exposures, even variables that were warned to have been + left uninitialized. + + Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, + pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore + more suitable as a security mitigation measure. + endchoice config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index ee5cb944f4ad..670a1aebb8a1 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/path.h> #include <linux/sched.h> /* current */ #include <linux/string_helpers.h> |