diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 87221fda1321..e2001c1e40b3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) */ subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt; - if (env->log.level > 1) + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start); @@ -1139,6 +1139,7 @@ static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *parent) { bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */ + int cnt = 0; while (parent) { /* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */ @@ -1155,7 +1156,11 @@ static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, state = parent; parent = state->parent; writes = true; + cnt++; } + + if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt) + env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt; return 0; } @@ -1455,7 +1460,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe. */ - if (env->log.level) + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) print_verifier_state(env, state); /* The minimum value is only important with signed @@ -2938,7 +2943,7 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ *insn_idx = target_insn; - if (env->log.level) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { verbose(env, "caller:\n"); print_verifier_state(env, caller); verbose(env, "callee:\n"); @@ -2978,7 +2983,7 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) return err; *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; - if (env->log.level) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); print_verifier_state(env, callee); verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx); @@ -5001,7 +5006,7 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, insn->dst_reg); return -EACCES; } - if (env->log.level) + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]); return 0; } @@ -6181,6 +6186,9 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) states_cnt++; } + if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt) + env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt; + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES) return 0; @@ -6194,6 +6202,8 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_sl) return -ENOMEM; + env->total_states++; + env->peak_states++; /* add new state to the head of linked list */ new = &new_sl->state; @@ -6278,8 +6288,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct bpf_verifier_state *state; struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi; struct bpf_reg_state *regs; - int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i; - int insn_processed = 0; + int insn_cnt = env->prog->len; bool do_print_state = false; env->prev_linfo = NULL; @@ -6314,10 +6323,10 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) insn = &insns[env->insn_idx]; class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code); - if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { + if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) { verbose(env, "BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n", - insn_processed); + env->insn_processed); return -E2BIG; } @@ -6326,7 +6335,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) return err; if (err == 1) { /* found equivalent state, can prune the search */ - if (env->log.level) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { if (do_print_state) verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n", env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx, @@ -6344,8 +6353,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (need_resched()) cond_resched(); - if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) { - if (env->log.level > 1) + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 || + (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx); else verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:", @@ -6356,7 +6366,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) do_print_state = false; } - if (env->log.level) { + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = { .cb_print = verbose, .private_data = env, @@ -6621,16 +6631,6 @@ process_bpf_exit: env->insn_idx++; } - verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ", - insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS); - for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { - u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; - - verbose(env, "%d", depth); - if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) - verbose(env, "+"); - } - verbose(env, "\n"); env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth; return 0; } @@ -7854,9 +7854,34 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) kfree(env->explored_states); } +static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) +{ + int i; + + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) { + verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n", + div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000)); + verbose(env, "stack depth "); + for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { + u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; + + verbose(env, "%d", depth); + if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt) + verbose(env, "+"); + } + verbose(env, "\n"); + } + verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d " + "total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n", + env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS, + env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states, + env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk); +} + int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr) { + u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns(); struct bpf_verifier_env *env; struct bpf_verifier_log *log; int i, len, ret = -EINVAL; @@ -7899,7 +7924,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, ret = -EINVAL; /* log attributes have to be sane */ if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 || - !log->level || !log->ubuf) + !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK) goto err_unlock; } @@ -7980,6 +8005,9 @@ skip_full_check: if (ret == 0) ret = fixup_call_args(env); + env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time; + print_verification_stats(env); + if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) ret = -ENOSPC; if (log->level && !log->ubuf) { |