Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities
   using IMA.

 - A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one
   mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the
   patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more
   flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts.

 - Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM
   credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy
   attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John
   is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of
   patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This
   change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/.

 - Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission
   list for two SELinux object classes.

* tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions
  smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
  selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
  lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
  nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock
  nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super()
  lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount
  selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool
  selinux: measure state and policy capabilities
  selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs

2 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 565e33ff19d0..4e5eb0236278 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
 				mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9ef748ea829f..b85d9e429426 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 	u32 secid;
 
 	if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
 					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 	}
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
 		return 0;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
 				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
 				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	u32 secid;
 
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
 				   0, MAY_READ, func);
 }
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+	security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
 	if (func) {
-		security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
+		security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
 		action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
 					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data);