diff options
| author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2018-10-23 01:11:04 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2018-10-25 17:11:42 -0700 |
| commit | ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 (patch) | |
| tree | 8b92c78f69702d0873305361ca6bc4f55978def3 /net/core | |
| parent | 4d716e10e3c59df6a2252353edb774dc819eb8f5 (diff) | |
bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations
Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.
Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.
Fixes: 290af86629b2 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c index b1a2c5e38530..37b4667128a3 100644 --- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c +++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c @@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_enable(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } -# ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT static int proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, @@ -290,7 +289,6 @@ proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -# endif #endif static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { @@ -397,6 +395,14 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = { .extra2 = &one, }, # endif + { + .procname = "bpf_jit_limit", + .data = &bpf_jit_limit, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_bpf_restricted, + .extra1 = &one, + }, #endif { .procname = "netdev_tstamp_prequeue", |