diff options
author | Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz> | 2018-10-02 13:35:33 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2018-10-03 02:53:47 +0200 |
commit | c64b7983288e636356f7f5f652de4813e1cfedac (patch) | |
tree | edfb41aae5c1be5e89e0e8f7a64a5d10f6e6b500 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
parent | 840b9615d6e9d134178b4dd4f3c30aa30643a379 (diff) |
bpf: Add PTR_TO_SOCKET verifier type
Teach the verifier a little bit about a new type of pointer, a
PTR_TO_SOCKET. This pointer type is accessed from BPF through the
'struct bpf_sock' structure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 120 |
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 98b218bd46e8..f86386c9affd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = { * (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type) * * When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register - * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer - * types recognized by check_mem_access() function. + * can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK, PTR_TO_SOCKET. These are + * four pointer types recognized by check_mem_access() function. * * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value' * and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible. @@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta", [PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end", [PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS] = "flow_keys", + [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = "sock", + [PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null", }; static char slot_type_char[] = { @@ -973,6 +975,8 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: return true; default: return false; @@ -1341,6 +1345,28 @@ static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, return 0; } +static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, + int size, enum bpf_access_type t) +{ + struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); + struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno]; + struct bpf_insn_access_aux info; + + if (reg->smin_value < 0) { + verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n", + regno); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (!bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) { + verbose(env, "invalid bpf_sock access off=%d size=%d\n", + off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { @@ -1459,6 +1485,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ strict = true; break; + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + pointer_desc = "sock "; + break; default: break; } @@ -1726,6 +1755,14 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size); if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); + } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET) { + if (t == BPF_WRITE) { + verbose(env, "cannot write into socket\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + err = check_sock_access(env, regno, off, size, t); + if (!err && value_regno >= 0) + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else { verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]); @@ -1948,6 +1985,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, err = check_ctx_reg(env, reg, regno); if (err < 0) return err; + } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_SOCKET) { + expected_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; + if (type != expected_type) + goto err_type; } else if (arg_type_is_mem_ptr(arg_type)) { expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be @@ -2543,6 +2584,10 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn } regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; + } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; + regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; } else { verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); @@ -2680,6 +2725,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; @@ -3627,6 +3674,8 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id, } else { reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE; } + } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) { + reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; } /* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we * should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances @@ -4402,6 +4451,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: case PTR_TO_PACKET_END: case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above * would have accepted */ @@ -4679,6 +4730,37 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) return 0; } +/* Return true if it's OK to have the same insn return a different type. */ +static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) +{ + switch (type) { + case PTR_TO_CTX: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: + return false; + default: + return true; + } +} + +/* If an instruction was previously used with particular pointer types, then we + * need to be careful to avoid cases such as the below, where it may be ok + * for one branch accessing the pointer, but not ok for the other branch: + * + * R1 = sock_ptr + * goto X; + * ... + * R1 = some_other_valid_ptr; + * goto X; + * ... + * R2 = *(u32 *)(R1 + 0); + */ +static bool reg_type_mismatch(enum bpf_reg_type src, enum bpf_reg_type prev) +{ + return src != prev && (!reg_type_mismatch_ok(src) || + !reg_type_mismatch_ok(prev)); +} + static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { struct bpf_verifier_state *state; @@ -4811,9 +4893,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) */ *prev_src_type = src_reg_type; - } else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type && - (src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || - *prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { + } else if (reg_type_mismatch(src_reg_type, *prev_src_type)) { /* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn * dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off) * with different pointer types: @@ -4858,9 +4938,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) { *prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type; - } else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type && - (dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX || - *prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) { + } else if (reg_type_mismatch(dst_reg_type, *prev_dst_type)) { verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -5286,8 +5364,10 @@ static void sanitize_dead_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } } -/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff' - * into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff' +/* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a + * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure: + * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff + * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock */ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) { @@ -5316,12 +5396,14 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } } - if (!ops->convert_ctx_access || bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) + if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) return 0; insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta; for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { + bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access; + if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) || insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) || @@ -5363,8 +5445,18 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } - if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX) + switch (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) { + case PTR_TO_CTX: + if (!ops->convert_ctx_access) + continue; + convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access; + break; + case PTR_TO_SOCKET: + convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; + break; + default: continue; + } ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size; size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn); @@ -5396,8 +5488,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } target_size = 0; - cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, - &target_size); + cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog, + &target_size); if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) || (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n"); |