diff options
author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2019-08-19 17:17:40 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2019-08-19 21:54:15 -0700 |
commit | 49fcf732bdae0550721ef73af7c45109ce26b2a9 (patch) | |
tree | cdf90d95cc5fb01413ac3c83f51796c1c3a0cdec /include | |
parent | 000d388ed3bbed745f366ce71b2bb7c2ee70f449 (diff) |
lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid
signatures that we can verify.
I have adjusted the errors generated:
(1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG,
ENOKEY), then:
(a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned.
(b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is
locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with
other lockdown cases).
(2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails
the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we
return the error we got.
Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not
be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet.
[Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will
be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy
patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 74787335d9ce..9e8abb60a99f 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ enum lsm_event { */ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_NONE, + LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, }; |